After a phishing incident has been identified, contained, and documented, it's essential to reflect on the event to:
Prevent recurrence of similar attacks
Raise user awareness
Enhance detection and response mechanisms
Feed lessons back into the security ecosystem
Continuously improve playbooks, tooling, and training
This phase closes the loop between incident response and security maturity, and is essential because:
95% of cyber incidents involve human error—user education is essential
Analysts can spot patterns in campaigns that help detect future attacks faster
Lessons from real incidents help tune security controls
Continuous feedback drives process improvement and reduces operational blind spots
Suggested steps to educate and improve future prevention, detection, response, and remediation measures include:
Conduct Targeted User Awareness and Training
Conduct a targeted awareness campaign if a phishing email reaches users or, worse, if someone interacts with it.
Highlight what the phishing email looked like and how to spot it in the future.
Reinforce key behaviors:
Don’t click unknown links or open suspicious attachments.
Always check sender details.
Report anything suspicious immediately.
Suggested training enhancements include:
Host quick sessions or webinars (15–30 minutes).
Share interactive phishing simulation results (if applicable).
Provide "what went wrong" breakdowns without blaming the user; This is a learning opportunity, not a disciplinary one.
Feed IOCs and Patterns into Detection Tools
Take everything learned from the incident and improve tooling and detection rules:
SIEM - Add search rules for sender domain, subject line, URLs, IPs
EDR/XDR - Add hash/IOC blocking, behavioral signatures
Email Security Gateway - Update filters, subject line keywords, domain blocklists
DNS/Proxy - Block known malicious domains/IPs involved in phishing
SOAR - Automate response playbooks based on verdicts from similar incidents
Goal - ensures that a similar attack next time will be detected earlier—or automatically blocked.
Update Internal Knowledge Base or Playbooks
Document and share:
The attack vector and tactics used (e.g., credential phishing via fake HR form)
The playbook adjustments made (e.g., “add step to check newly registered domains”)
The response timeline (what went well, what caused delays)
Any tuning recommendations for filtering or detection thresholds
The updated documentation can be used to:
Train new SOC analysts
Conduct team knowledge-sharing sessions
Inform tabletop exercises or red team simulations
Run a Follow-Up Phishing Simulation
If feasible, run a targeted phishing simulation a few weeks later to test:
Whether users apply the lessons learned
If detection and response times have improved
If automation rules trigger correctly
Simulations provide measurable data to validate that “education + improvements” are effective.
Review Metrics and KPIs
Post-incident, assess the security team’s performance using key metrics:
Time to Detect (TTD) - How long it took to discover the phishing email
Time to Contain (TTC) - How long it took to quarantine or block the threat
Click Rate - How many users interacted with the phishing message
False Positives - How many safe messages were flagged during detection
IOC Reuse - Whether indicators were already known but not blocked
Use these metrics in team retrospectives, compliance reports, or security maturity dashboards.
Collaborate and Share with Other Teams
Depending on the severity or novelty of the phishing attack:
Share your findings with IT, DevOps, Legal, HR, and Management.
Notify your MSSP or upstream provider if external infrastructure was abused.
Submit IOCs or campaign details to:
Threat intel sharing communities (e.g., MISP, ISACs)
Public databases like PhishTank, URLhaus, AbuseIPDB
Vendors whose brand was spoofed (e.g., Google, Microsoft, banks)
Sharing helps the wider cybersecurity community and builds your organization's reputation.
Update Incident Response and Escalation Procedures
Based on the challenges or bottlenecks during the incident:
Improve decision trees for phishing detection
Add auto-escalation rules to reduce manual triage
Refine response authority levels (e.g., “when to notify CISO or legal”)
The goal is to reduce friction and improve speed for the next incident.
Not informing users after a phishing incident (“sweeping it under the rug”)
Skipping updates to detection systems (leaving gaps open)
Treating post-incident improvement as optional
Blaming users without providing guidance or training